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JUDICIAL SELECTION: ALTERNATIVES
TO THE STATUS QUO IN THE SELECTION
OF STATE COURT JUDGES
MARTIN I. KAMINSKYO
Former United States Solicitor General and Harvard Law School
Dean Erwin N. Griswold once concluded: "[O]n the experience of
more than a century... one of the worst ways for choosing judges is
through popular election ... despite the fact that occasionally a great
judge is chosen by the people."1
For over 100 years the New York Legislature has been eithdr
unable or unwilling to change our elective system of selecting state
judges, in spite of consistent criticism and the efforts of numerous re-
form movements supported by leading politicians, jurists and legal
scholars throughout the state. For nearly a century, the shrewdest and
most able politicians and reformers have been baffled by the reasons
for this inaction and have struggled to fashion a solution. Yet the neces-
sity for reform is beyond dispute, and several workable alternatives are
indisputably available. I
This article will attempt to probe those alternatives, as well as the
historical background and the relative pros and cons of the different
methods of judicial selection which are presently in effect in this coun-
try and abroad, in the hope of encouraging at least a temporary mini-
mum solution- mandatory screening of all potential judges, whether
elected or appointed, by a bipartisan panel focusing on the merit and
ability of the candidates.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE ALTERNATIVES
The adage, "One rotten apple spoils the bunch," aptly describes
our judicial system.2 When a sitting judge abuses or suppresses justice,
our entire system of justice suffers, with far-reaching ramifications on
* A.B., Yale University, 1962; LL.B., Harvard University, 1965. Member of the New
York Bar. The author wishes to thank Ms. JoAnn Cory for her assistance in the preparation
of this article.
1 SPECIAL COMM. ON JUDIClAL SELxcrION AND TENURE REPORTS, 18 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
581, 584 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Comimi. RFPORTs].
2 As one distinguished jurist has stated: "[t]he derelictions and incompetence of the
few taint the entire Bench in the eyes of the public, since the day-to-day excellence and
dedication of the many are not generally newsworthy." Botein, Judges and Their Critics:
A Need for Understanding, 169 N.Y.LJ. 17, Jan. 24, 1973, at S-9, col. 3. See also Utter,
Selection and Retention - A Judge's Perspective, 48 WAsH. L. Rav. 839, 845-46 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Utter].
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the public's confidence in the system as a whole. In a very real sense,
the system is judged by the man.3
Under our present system state judges are first nominated as can-
didates for judicial office at politically-oriented judicial conventions.
The conventions are not well publicized and, indeed, a large portion
of the populace does not even know they exist. Even those who par-
ticipate in these conventions have dubbed them "boss-controlled." 4
Thereafter, the candidates go before the public on Election Day just
like candidates for the Assembly, Senate and Congress. Frequently, by
agreement of the political leaders of the major parties, the same candi-
dates are assured, before the conventions, of receiving both nomination
and multi-party endorsement.5
A surprisingly large number of our most distinguished legal minds
have spoken out against the system in extremely blunt terms.0 New
a The problem is not, of course, entirely with the judges. When a litigant or a lawyer
loses a case, it is all too easy to blame the court rather than look realistically to the merits
or one's own presentation of the case. So long as people differ sharply enough to take their
disputes through a court proceeding, someone will always be disappointed in the result.
In that sense the judge's plight is surely a thankless one. Cf. Golomb, For Election, 24 N.Y.
Co. B. BULL., 215, 216 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Golomb]. However, there are judges who
are not qualified and cases which are wrongly decided. No one can seriously dispute that
this flaw in the system can be substantially alleviated if we improve the way we select the
judges.
In fairness to all our judges, it must also be remembered that they are forced to
operate under severe time pressures and over-crowded dockets. Justice Botein, who had
been one of the most constant advocates for reform of our present system, recently reem-
phasized this problem at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the New York State Bar Association:
Our judges have become caught up in a frenetic campaign against a voracious
calendar. ... In the old days, even a bad judge, ponderously lumbering through
a world of law he did not make and could not understand, looked good because
he had plenty of time to cloak himself with the armour of spurious dignity and
remoteness.... How can a judge maintain his dignity, give careful deliberation
to the case before him, when the next cases in line are pushing and clamoring for
attention?
Botein, Judges and their Critics: A Need for Understanding, 169 N.Y.L.J. 17, Jan. 24, 1973,
at S-9, col. 3.
4 See Rosenman, A Better Way to Select Judges, 48 J. AM. Juv. Soc'y 86-88 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenman]; COMM. REP oRTs, supra note 1, at 584 (quoting Harold
Medina); Niles, The Changing Politics of Judicial Selection: A Merit Plan for New York,
22 RxcoRn OF N.Y.C.B.A. 242, 244-45 (1967) [hereinafter cited as A Merit Plan for New
York]; M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To TE VIarOR . . . POLITICAL PATRONAGE FROM THE
CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHrrE Housa 143 (1971) [hereinafter cited as TOLCHIN]. See also N.Y.
Times, Oct. 4, 1972, at 1, col. 8; id., July 20, 1972, at 32, col. 2; N.Y. Post, Jan. 28, 1970,
at 32, col. 1.
5 Thus the authors remarked in Klein & Witztum Judicial Administration 1972-73,
1972-73 ANNUAL SURvEY OF AMERIcAN LAW 717, 718 (Inst. of Judicial Admin. 1973) [here-
inafter cited as Judicial Administration 1972-73]:
Perhaps Boss Tweed's immortal words, "You can vote for any candidate you choose
so long as you let me choose him" best describe the selection system of candidates
for the election of judges for the New York State Supreme Court ....
6 when the 1967 New York State Constitutional Convention met, a blue-ribbon
Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York commented:
The present New York system of popular election of judges is inherently incapable
1974]
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Yorkers, of course, do not have to settle for the present system -but
if it is to be changed, something of a political "uprising" will be neces-
sary. Those in power show little willingness or ability to bring about
the change alone. For example, at least three different reform proposals
(one proposed by the Governor, 7 one by the Mayor of the City of New
York8 and another by one of the leading candidates for the post of
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals) 9 were introduced in the 1972-73
New York State legislative session. But despite unanimous support for
reform in the press and among civic and bar associations, 10 the question
never even reached the floor of the Legislature for a vote. This ex-
perience has not dulled the ambition of the reformers, who plan an
even bolder proposal for the 1974' legislative session.", The past 100
years have shown that the necesary reformers are present, but there is
lacking the necessary legislative votes to adopt their reforms.
The available alternatives, each of which is discussed at length
below, include:
(1) Mandatory screening of all candidates prior to either election
or appointment; 12
(2) Appointment rather than election;18
(3) Election on a non-partisan basis; 14
of performing the function it should now serve - that of bringing to the bench
not haphazardly or occasionally but consistently and routinely as possible, the very
best talent available and willing to serve.
Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CrY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITr EE ON THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION, SELECTION OF JUDGES, at 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SELECTION
OF JUDGEs]. One need not agree completely with these admittedly partisan assessments to
join in the call for reform or to recognize that it represents an important negative assess-
ment from some of the leading lawyers who actually practice in our courts.
7 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 6; id., Feb. 28, 1973, at 19, col. 2. Cf. id., May
28, 1973, at 36, col. 2; id., Apr. 25, 1973, at 58, col. 1.
8 See id., Dec. 28, 1972, at 28, col. 1; id., Oct. 4, 1972, at 1, col. 8. See also Lindsay, The
Selection of Judges, 21 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 514 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Lindsay].
9 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1973, at 30, col. 2; id., Dec. 2, 1972, at 37, col. 8; id., Oct. 4,
1972, at 1, col. 8. See also Weinstein, The Role of the Chief Judge in a Modern System of
Justice, 28 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 291 (1973).
10 See notes 1-3 supra. See also 169 N.Y.L.J. 48, Mar. 12, 1973, at 1, col. 6, where the
New York State Bar Association called for abolition of our present method of selection
and a switch to the "merit plan," discussed below.
11 See S. 7072, 197th Reg. Sess. (1974). Governor Wilson, however, has announced his
opposition to appointment of judges, with the possible exception of the Court of Appeals.
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1974, at 74, col. 6.
12 See notes 46-50 and accompanying text infra; notes 100-03 and accompanying text
infra.
18 See notes 61-99 and accompanying text infra.
14 Very little enthusiasm for non-partisan election appears to exist. Indeed, in many
states which have such a system at present, the judges elected under that system themselves
call for a change. See, e.g., Hunter, Some Thoughts About Judicial Reform, 19 DE PAUL
L. Rxv. 457 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hunter]; Utter, supra note 2.
Those favoring partisan election have long opposed non-partisan election on the
[Vol. 48:496
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(4) Adoption of new procedures for review of judicial performance
and removal of unfit judges; 15
(5) Adoption of a professional or career judiciary with prospective
judges specially schooled and trained for their posts. 6
None of these alternatives is new. Some, such as appointment and
mandatory screening, have previously been proposed (unsuccessfully)
by various state and local bar associations, most notably when the State
Constitution was amended in 1967,1' and when the highly-regarded
1970 Hansen-Duryea Judicial Reform Bill8 actually emerged from a
legislative committee, only to die on the floor of the Assembly. Some
of the alternatives are already in practice in other states. And the "pro-
fessional judiciary" has been in effect in many European and other
countries for decades. Yet none has been adopted or even tested in New
York.
Before touching on the alternatives in greater detail, a considera-
tion of the historical context out of which our present elective system
grew may aid in understanding the problem.
II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPEGIVE
The method for selection of our state judges has been a hot polit-
ical potato since before the Revolutionary War, first as an offshoot of
the virtually feudal colonization of New York and then as an overreac-
tion to that system. New York was originally settled pursuant to huge
royal land grants to the early Dutch patroons and overlord friends of
the British crown.' 9 Sections of these baronies were then rented by the
manorial lords to tenant farmers at high rents and subject to the often
oppressive control of the overlord. In this fashion the Van Rensselaer
ground that it removes all possible screening (i.e., the party's screening) of candidates and
deprives the public of key information about them. One of the early proponents of this
view was former President and United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William Howard
Taft. See Taft, The Selection and Tenure of Judges, 38 A.B.A. REP. 418 (1913). See also
Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.E.AJ. 1162 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Harding].
The prestigious and knowledgeable American Judicature Society has called the non-
partisan election system "the dictatorship of irrelevancy" since it gives the voters nothing
but a name and gut reaction to base their choice upon. Editorial, 48 J. ANT. JUD. Soc'Y 124,
125 (1964).
l5See notes 58-60 and accompanying text infra.
16 See notes 112-16 and accompanying text infra.
17 See SELEIaON oF JuDGEs, supra note 6.
1s See notes 46-54 and accompanying text infra.
19 See I. MARK, AGRARIAN CONFLICTS IN COLONIAL NEv YoRK 1711-75 (1940) [herein-
after cited as MAnE]. See also D. Fox, TnE D cLINE oF AlUSrocRAcY IN THE POLITIcs OF
NEv YoRK (1919); Niles, The Popular Election of Judges in Historical Perspective, 21
REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 523 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Niles].
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family dominated over one millon acres and the Livingstons half a
million.2
0
Concomitant with ownership and control over the land, the ma-
norial barons had full control over the colonial "legislature," since
only landowners could vote, and over the judicial and legal machinery
which governed the tenants.21 The courts, which were appointed and
financed by the overlord, were naturally but inexcusably prejudiced
in his favor, especially when confronted with issues regarding his
oppressive leases. 22
Shortly before the Revolution, the tenants' patience and deference
to the landlords' courts and the corruption which seemed to pervade
the whole judicial system began to run out. Outriglit tenant revolts
erupted, culminating in the Great Rebellion of 1766, when open war-
fare between the tenants and the landlords broke out in upper West-
chester and Dutchess Counties.23 The landlords won the war; the
judges, acting almost as pawns of the landlords, faithfully meted out
stiff criminal penalties and ejectment decisions against the rioting and
striking tenants. The tenants' leader, Prendergast, was convicted and
sentenced to be hanged, drawn and quartered in public, despite a re-
putedly brilliant defense led by his wife. 24 As Irving Mark, one of the
leading scholars on the period, has observed:
In the face of the political dominance of the landlord, the small
farmer had neither the power to shape the laws nor the wealth to
sustain the expense of judicial redress. 25
Although some historians (most notably Charles Beard) have
sought to describe the American Revolution as a socio-economic up-
rising,26 the manorial system in New York seems evidence in itself that
this was not so. The chief beneficiaries of the break-up of the manors
of the loyalist overlords were not the public, but rather those overlords
who had supported the Revolution and had the necessary funds to bid
successfully at the public auctions of those lands.27
20 See MARK, supra note 19, chs. II, III. As Mark further notes, many of the manors
were built through outright corruption and shady deals that swindled the Indians, espe-
cially during the regimes of Governors Fletcher, Bellomont, and Cornbury over the twenty
year period 1690-1710. Id. See also Niles, supra note 19, at 523.
21 Id. at 523-24.
22 Id. at 524. Indeed, it was not until 1859 that the feudal manor system in New York
was declared invalid in the landmark case of Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N.Y. 68 (1859).
23 MARK, supra note 19, ch. V.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 C. BEARD & E. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPR rATiON OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913); A.
FLEcK, LOYALiSM IN NEW YORK IN THE AMmuCAN REVOLUTION (1901); J. JAMESON, THE
AMERICAN REVOLTIMON CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL MovEMENT (1926).
27 E. SPAULDING, NEW YORK IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD, ch. III, IV (1932) [hereinafter cited
[Vol. 48:496
JUDICIAL SELECTION
While the State Constitution of 1777 did reduce somewhat the
enormous manorial power over the government, it left the land system
basically intact. The constitution created a Council of Appointment
which made all judicial appointments.28 The Council was composed of
one senator from each defined district. Needless to add, the landlords
continued in direct and indirect control of the Council and the state
legislature which it served. While New York's manorial system had
many unique qualities, the appointive system for judicial selection was
not one of them. Indeed, immediately after the Revolution seven of
the newly independent states vested selection of their judges in their
state legislatures.2 9
The adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1787 brought little,
if any, change. Indeed, while in New York the major opposition to the
new federal system came from those areas which contained the large
manors, it came from the tenants and not the landlords. 80 The second
New York State Constitution in 1821, however, did seek to effect some
reform, transferring the power of judicial selection to the Governor,
with confirmation by the Senate. 1
The matter might conceivably have rested there were it not for
the advent of "Jacksonian democracy" throughout the country. The
importance to the judicial systems of every state of this national move-
ment - and it was national - cannot be underestimated. As Chief
Justice Donald H. Hunter of the Indiana Supreme Court has accu-
rately described the movement:
The Jacksonians believed that American judges were invested with
legislative functions .... In the eyes of some, the courts were be-
ginning to act and legislate according to the common law, without
responsibility to any controlling authority. So strong was this feel-
ing that New Jersey and Kentucky actually passed statutes prohib-
iting the citation of common law authority. The end result was a
popular clamor for judges to be placed under the direct control of
the electorate. The rationalization for such a system was the be-
lief that the elected judges were more likely to adjudicate disputes
according to the popular will and opinion of the people.32
as SPAULDING]. See also H. Yosmsz, THE DISPOSITION OF LOYALIST ESTATES IN THE SounmN
Dlsnucr OF NEv YoRK (1939).
28 SELMEEION OF JuDGEs, supra note 6, at 2.
29 See Alexander, The Selection and Education of the Judiciary -Some Unfinished
Tasks, 40 PENN. BJ. 57, 62 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Alexander]; A Merit Plan for New
York, supra note 4, at 247; Note, Judicial Selection and Tenure - The Merit Plan in Ohio,
42 U. CIN. L REv. 255, 260 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Selection and Tenure].
80 SPAULDING, supra note 27, ch. Vi.
316 HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW Yomt 1-35 (A. Flick ed. 1984); Niles, supra note 19,
at 524.
82 Hunter, supra note 14, at 459. See also A. ScHf.EsiNGER, Tun AGE oF JAcKsON (1945);
TnE PRESIDENT's COMm'N ON LAW ENFORIZIENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusrIC, TASK
1974]
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New York was no different. For twenty years the tenants' power
and appetites grew, gradually evolving from "passive resistance ... to
active interference with legal process." 33 Historians record that, by
1845, the situation was so critical that the landlords felt it unsafe to
travel through the countryside, even in daylight.3 4
The change in New York finally came with the Constitutional
Convention of 1846, the first New York Constitutional Convention
actually dominated by "the people" and not the landed gentry. The
new constitution abolished the old appointive system and ushered into
being a national era of election of judges.3 5 In the words of former
Dean Russell Niles:
The consequences of the decision in New York to abandon the ap-
pointive system in all courts of superior jurisdiction had an im-
mediate profound influence in many other states. In 1846, only a
few states had experimented with the elective system in their in-
ferior courts. Mississippi alone had adopted an elective system for
all judges. By 1856, however, 15 of the 29 states had swung over to
popular election of judges - seven in the year 1850. Thereafter,
as new states were admitted to the Union, all accepted the popular
election of some or all of their judges up until the admission of
Alaska.36
For a time the new system worked. By the 1860's, a steady series of
new decisions had effectively removed the landlords' yoke over the
populace.3 7 But all was not roses. Judgeships had already become polit-
ical plums within the control of powerful local political leaders, as the
two-party system, as we know it today, gradually took hold throughout
the country. By the time of the 1867 Constitutional Convention, during
which the term of our judges was expanded from 8 to 14 years, the
matter was already the subject of angry debate. 38
FoRc REPORT: THE COURTS, 66 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS]; Alexander, supra note 29, at 62; Allard, Application of the Missouri Court Plan
to Judicial Selection and Tenure in America Today, 15 BUFF. L. REv. 378 (1966) [herein-
after cited as Allard]; Judicial Selection and Tenure, supra note 29, at 260-61; Note, Judicial
Selection in North Dakota- Is Constitutional Revision Necessary?, 48 N.D.L. REv. 327, 328
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Selection in North Dakota].
By 1860, 22 of the 34 states chose their judges by partisan election. More significantly,
every state admitted to the Union from 1846 to Alaska's admission in 1958 entered with
an elected judiciary. See Dunn, Judicial Selection and Tenure - A Merit Plan for Arizona?,
9 Apiz. L. REv. 297, 298 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dunn]; Niles, supra note 19, at 527.
33 Id. at 524. See Niven, A Chapter of Anti-Rent History, 24 ALBANY L.J. 125 (1881).
34 Niles, supra note 19, at 524.
35 See REPORT OF DEBATES AND PROCEDINGS OF CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1846).
36 Niles, supra note 19, at 527.
37 See, e.g., Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N.Y. 68 (1859).
38 SELECTION OF JUDGES, supra note 6, at 3; Winters & Allard, Two Dozen Misconcep-
tions About Judicial Selection, 48 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 138, 139 (1964).
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By 1873 the issue was severe enough to be put to the voters by
referendum.39 Many loud voices, such as the prestigious Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, called sharply for a return to the
appointive system, arguing that election "has neither inspired nor
strengthened anything good among the people" but rather "has lowered
the dignity of the bench, weakened the force of law, [and] impaired
public confidence in the administration of justice." 40
But the public, by narrow vote, chose to retain the system. That
was 100 years ago. The 1967 proposed state constitution, which was
rejected by the electorate, contained a new judiciary article which,
inter alia, reformed the method of selecting judges, but not since 1873
have the voters faced squarely a choice on this issue.
For the next ninety-seven years, aside from some modifications
made by the Constitutional Convention of 1894, which ceded to the
Mayor of the City of New York the power to appoint city criminal
court judges, 41 no significant steps were taken to accomplish a change.
Pitted against this inaction was the consistent clamoring of the New
York City Bar Association (at constitutional conventions and other-
wise in 1915, 1932, 1938, 1952 and 1967), among others, for reform
either by appointment or election from a list which would not show the
party affiliation of the candidates.42
All of these proposals were ignored and, as the power of local
political leaders grew, actively suppressed by both political parties.
Rather, a tradition of political appointment-swapping and collaboration
between the two major parties followed. All too often we were told of
judgeships being used for political pay-offs and otherwise as currency
in smoke-filled back rooms.4a
Curiously, the most vocal and eloquent critics of the elective sys-
tem have been some of the judges themselves. Former Justice Samuel
Rosenman has commented:
Sometimes the [judicial] districts are so overwhelmingly dominated
by one political party that the nomination by these leaders must
result in election; even in doubtful districts, interparty political
deals often deprive the voters of any real choice.44
39 SELETON OF JUDGES, supra note 6, at 8. See also I REPaors OF THE N.Y.C. BAR ASS'N
(1870-1876).
40 SEEcmoN OF JUDGES, supra note 6, at 1 nA.
41 Id. at 3.
42 SoxELnoN OF JuDcES, supra note 6, at 1 nA; Lindsay, supra note 8, at 516; Niles,
supra note 19, at 536 n.49.
43 See note 4 and accompanying text supra. See also TASK FoacE REPORT: THE CouRTs,
supra note 32, at 67. Judicial Administration 1972-73, supra note 5, at 718.
44 Rosenman, supra note 4, at 88.
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Perhaps worst of all, virtually no one even bothers to campaign
actively any more, so that the public goes to the ballot box totally un-
informed as to who the nominees are, why they were nominated, and
what qualifications they would bring to the post.45 Except for a few
isolated instances involving the highest or special courts (such as the
Breitel-Fuchsberg Court of Appeals contest and the Silverman-Klein
surrogate's court election), campaigning is virtually nonexistent, and
the ballot consists of a list of unknown names with multiparty endorse-
ment. In this sense, a switch to so-called nonpartisan election, i.e.,
election from a list of names without a listing of party affiliation, will
improve the system only marginally, if at all.
III. THE PROPOSAL FOR MANDATORY SCREENING: THE JUDICIAL
REFORM BILL AND ITS AFTERMATH
In 1970, the New York Legislature confronted the first well-
organized and potentially successful piece of legislation in the area of
judicial selection to be raised in almost one hundred years. After care-
ful consultation with the Republican floor and Judiciary Committee
leaders in both the State Assembly and Senate, the Hansen-Duryea
Judicial Reform Bill of 1970 was drafted, filed for consideration, and
announced to the public in a news conference on January 30, 1970.46
The new bill represented a thoughtful attempt to reform our
method of judicial selection without falling into the same pitfall which
45 That judicial nominees have adopted a "low profile" is fully understandable and not
necessarily a bad thing. Rufus Choate, a distinguished delegate to the 1858 Massachusetts
Constitutional Convention eloquently argued in opposition to the adoption of an elective
system of judicial selections:
So nominated, the candidate is put through a violent election; abused by the press,
abused on the stump, charged ten thousand times over with being very little of a
lawyer, and a good deal of a knave or boor; and after being tossed on this kind
of blanket for some uneasy months is chosen by a majority of ten votes out of a
hundred thousand, and comes into it breathless, terrified, with perspiration in
drops on his brow, wondering how he ever got there, to take his seat on the bench.
And in the very first cause he tries he sees on one side the counsel who procured
his nomination in caucus, and has defended him by pen and tongue before the
people, and on the other, the most prominent of his assailants; one who has been
denying his talents, denying his learning, denying his integrity, denying him
every judicial quality, and every quality that may define a good man, before half
the counties in the state.
2 OFFICIAL REPORT oF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS TO REVISE AND AMEND TBE CONST-U-
TION OF MAss. 799 (1853), quoted in Niles, supra note 19, at 584 n.29.
46 The sponsors of the bill and spokesmen at the news conference were Assembly
Speaker Perry B. Duryea, Jr. and then-Manhattan Assemblyman Stephen C. Hansen (later
a high ranking official in the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development).
They announced that the bill had already been reviewed and approved by Earl W. Brydges,
Senate Majority Leader, John G. Hughes, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Edward F. Crawford, Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee and Republican-
Liberal Senator Roy M. Goodman. As noted below, this broad support soon withered away,
at least in the State Senate.
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for so long had stopped reform proposals in their inception - that is,
the attempt to switch to a completely appointive system. On a one year
trial basis,47 all candidates for election to the state supreme court, New
York's court of first instance, would have to be certified "highly quali-
fied" by a specially appointed "judicial qualifications committee" be-
fore being permitted to run for office. The committee would screen the
candidates on the basis of "age, judicial temperament, legal experience,
standing in the community and such other factors as it feels are neces-
sary for the proper conduct of the office."'48 Since all judges of the four
appellate divisions (the courts of first appeal) are and by law must be
appointed from among the justices currently sitting in the supreme
court, this would assure highly qualified judges in both the trial and
first appellate court. Anyone could suggest that any name (including
his own) be placed in nomination, but only those who passed the man-
datory screening process would actually be permitted on the ballot.
Each of the eleven districts in the state would have its own judicial
qualification committee. Each screening committee would be composed
of twelve persons, four of whom would be selected by the Governor,
four by the presiding justice of the local appellate division, and four
by the administrative justice of the local supreme court, thus insuring
that the executive branch would not exercise domination over the
judicial branch of our state government.
The concept of "screening" of judicial candidates itself was not
new. Similar proposals had often been made in the past and screening
for appointive judicial office was already in practice in several states,
the most notable being Missouri which had pioneered the process thirty
years earlier.49 Likewise, even in New York, various local bar associa-
47 That the mandatory screening process was to be instituted for one year on a trial
basis only was a cardinal aspect of the bill. After a year, the Legislature would again re-
view the matter and iron out any bugs or flaws which had emerged. In this way, it was
hoped that any minor imperfections in the draftsmanship of the bill would not doom it
in the Legislature and that it could be enacted without either extensive redrafting or the
criticism that it would commit the state to a new program sight unseen.
48 N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1970, at 24, col. 7. See also id., June 23, 1970, at 20, col. 3; id.,
Mar. 6, 1970, at 38, col. 2.
49 See TASK FOR E REPORT: TBE CouRTs, sufra note 32, at 66; Buckley, The "Nassau
Plan" for Selection of Better Judges, 34 N.Y.S.B.J. 345 (1962); Hentel, The "Queens Plan-
for Selection of Better Judges, 34 N.Y.S.B.J. 23 (1962); Hunting, Toward the Best Possible
Judges, 15 RlcoRD or N.Y.C.B.A. 400 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hunting]; Judicial Selec-
tion, 10 RrcoPD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 498 (1955). See also Allard, supra note 32; Garwood, Popular
Election of Judges Is Not Sacrosanct, 38 FLA. B.J. 349 (1964); Hunter, supra note 14; Miller,
Politics and the Courts: The Struggle for Good Judges Goes On, 42 A.B.A.J. 939 (1956);
VanOsdol, Politics and Judicial Selection, 28 ALA lAw. 167 (1967); Winters, Judicial Se-
lection and Tenure-The Missouri Plan, 58 ILL. BJ. 511 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Winters).
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tions were screening many of the candidates on a voluntary basis.50
What was new was that the screening under the Hansen-Duryea bill
was of candidates for election to judicial office, that it provided for
mandatory and not merely voluntary screening, and that it stood a
genuine chance of adoption.
The bill was hailed by bar associations, the media, civic groups
and prominent members of the judiciary,51 but the local party leaders
were not to be so easily deprived of one of their most valued political
plums. Heavy behind-the-scenes politicking was reported.52 Legislators
up for reelection in both parties were reportedly threatened with ex-
pensive primaries and a shut-off of financial contributions from their
local party organizations if they backed the bill. Floor support disap-
peared and the bill went down to defeat.53 A number of apologies and
promises followed the defeat,54 but, of course, nothing has happened.
The power of the political leaders still looms large.
IV. THE 1970-73 TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS
The 1970 adventure was not, however, to be totally abortive. At
least as a partial result thereof, a Temporary Commission on the New
York State Court System was created.5 5 Assemblymen Hansen and
50 See Judicial Selection, 10 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 498 (1955).
51 The New York Times endorsed the bill, reporting:
Good government groups have long advocated reform of the judicial selection
process. They argue that the party judicial conventions at which nominations
are made are "boss-controlled" and that nominations are "payoffs" for services to
the party.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1970, at 24, col. 7. The Buffalo Evening News agreed that enactment
of the bill "would be a solid gain in its safeguards against secret backroom deals and in
its promotion of public confidence in the quality of justice." Buffalo Evening News, Feb. 2,
1970 (Editorial).
52 N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1970, at 28, col. 2. See also id., June 23, 1970, at 32, col. 3.
53 By the time the bill had been reported out of committee in the Assembly in late
February and early March, the Senate Majority Leader had withdrawn his support, claim-
ing to have "misread" the bill before the January 50 news conference and asserting that
he favored only "advisory" screening whereby a candidate would be allowed to stand for
office regardless of the judgment of the screening committee as to his qualifications. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 12, 1970, at 32, col. 3. Others who had been counted upon to sponsor the bill
in the State Senate followed suit, offering only "protocol problems" as a reason for their
change of position. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1970, at 28, col. 2.
But the most disappointing performance came when the bill actually went to the
floor of the Assembly. A near bloc vote by Democrats and by a handful of Republicans with
Conservative Party endorsement brought the bill to a narrow defeat. Only one Democrat,
Oliver Koppell of the Bronx, spoke out for the bill. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1970, at 31, col. 1.
54 Some of the legislators declared that they would be offering their own bills which
would require selection by appointment. Assembly Minority Leader Albert Blumenthal said
that, although he had led the floor debate against the bill for his fellow Democrats, he
favored reform "in principle." N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1970 at 31, col. I; id., Mar. 5, 1970,
at 28, col. 2.
55 Ch. 943, [1970] N.Y. Laws 2893.
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Crawford who had sponsored and labored for the unsuccessful 1970
reform bill were both designated charter members of the Commission.
In 1973, the Temporary Commission announced the results of its
three-year study of the state court system, with far-reaching proposals
on virtually every aspect of the judiciary except selection of judges.
By an apparent split vote, the twelve-man bipartisan commission re-
jected the idea of doing away with election and moving to appointment
of all judges. And while the Commission suggested that all appointed
judges (such as those of the court of claims) face mandatory screening,
no such screening was suggested for those judges (the" vast majority)
who were to be elected.5
Although it did recommend that the anachronistic politically-con-
trolled judicial nominating conventions be abolished,57 the focus of the
Commission's remarks was directed at curing selection errors after the
fact rather than prevention of those errors before the fact. For example,
it recommended that a fully staffed permanent Commission on Judicial
Conduct (to be composed of judges, lawyers and laymen) be created to
investigate complaints about and review the performance of both
elected and appointed judges on a continuing basis.58 This disciplinary
body would have the power to censure judges and, in severe cases,
initiate proceedings before the Court on the Judiciary, which has the
power to discipline and even remove any of our judges from office. Such
judicial overseeing bodies have recently been proposed and adopted in
some of our sister states, such as California and Colorado. 9
A more systematic scrutiny over sitting judges would be a step
forward in insuring a high level of performance on the courts, provided
that the review power is seriously and sensibly exercised. Some periodic
S6 See Judicial Administration 1972-73, supra note 5, at 718-19.
57 The Temporary Commission described the nominating conventions as follows:
This method of selecting nominees is subject to two major failings. First, the
method of allocating the number of delegates to the convention from each county,
the selection of these delegates and indeed the very proceedings of the conventions
are not well publicized and therefore generally not visible to the electorate. Second,
since the number of delegates to the convention is geared to population, the more
populous counties have been able to control the nominating convention and have
tended to nominate supreme court justices from the residents of these counties....
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the abolition of the judicial district
convention. The Commission recognizes that partisan politics cannot be eliminated
as a basis for judicial selection even if the size of the electoral unit is reduced
from the judicial district to the county. The abolition of the district convention
system will, however, eliminate the almost invisible nature of the proceedings and
will permit the voters to become better informed of the proceedings.Id.
58 See Id.
59 See Workbook on California Merit Plan, 43 CALw. ST. B.J. 153 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as California Workbook]; Note, A Study of the Colorado Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, 47 DENvER L.J. 491 (1970). See also Braithwaite, Removal and Retirement
of Judges in Missouri: A Field Study, 1968 WASH. U.LJ. 379 (1968).
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day-to-day observance of the judge while he is on the bench would
seem essential. The disciplinary commission would clearly have to
guard against being misled by or becoming bogged down in crank com-
plaints and criticisms related not to the qualifications of the man but
rather to the popularity of his decisions.
But such a disciplinary body need not and should not be our
exclusive safeguard. We should try to avoid mistakes beforehand, by
carefully screening all candidates, before either appointment or elec-
tion, so as to insure that they are highly qualified for the office of judge
before they ever ascend to that office. 60
V. APPOINTMENT OR ELECrION?
The threshold question, "Should we appoint rather than elect our
state judges?," has provoked constant and bitter argument for over a
century. The dispute focuses primarily on the following issues.
The Intrusion of Politics into the Selection Process
The most basic and heated criticism of the elective system is that
it is subject to the political machinations of local party leaders, who are
accused of using judgeships as political currency to repay party regulars
for political loyalty.
Former United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell wrote
in a frank article in 1964:
As a matter of hard fact, judges are in most instances picked by
political leaders. This is quite obvious in the case of elected judges.
The party conventions and primaries that nominate judges are
managed by professional politicians. This is what politicians are
for. Sometimes they have good candidates nominated, but most
often their favor ... shines on mediocre candidates.61
Similar indictments of the judiciary have come from leading politicians,
lawyers, newspapers and the judges themselves. 62 The local party lead-
60As Dean Roscoe Pound aptly stated, "Too much thought has been given to the
matter of getting less qualified judges off the bench. The real remedy is not to put them
on." Pound, Introduction to E. HAYNES, SELEMrON AND TxuaE OF JUroaM at xiv, quoted in
Dunn, supra note 32, at 303.
61 SATURDAY EvENING Posr, Apr. 18, 1964, quoted in Allard, supra note 32, at 383.
62 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration, appointed
by President Johnson, which was chaired by former Attorney General Katzenbah and
included such dignitaries as current Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Whitney
M. Young, Jr., New York Court of Appeals (now Chief) Judge Charles D. Breitel and Yale
President Kingman Brewster, and which was ably staffed under Harvard Law School Pro-
fessor James Vorenberg, found in its official report on "The Courts" in 1967:
The true judgemakers are the leaders of the dominant party who select its candi-
dates. The process of selection is apt to be carried on in private meetings. Intricate
bargaining patterns may evolve in which certain political leaders will assert
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ers naturally protest this assessment, claiming that they act diligently
and with the public's interest at hand and pointing out that many su-
perior judges have sat and continue to sit on our state benches.0 This
argument has been strongly disputed. 4
Others who support the elective system argue that no system
of judicial selection will remove politics from the process. They claim
that appointment will merely result in the selection of judges by execu-
tive politics and by those close to the governor, rather than by the
county leaders. 65 This argument, of course, is no answer to the criticism
dominion over certain judgeships, and balances must be struck to reward the
party's principal financial supporters or those who have labored for the party orga-
nization. All too frequently in this bargaining process scant attention is given to
the abilities of the proposed candidate.
See TAsK FORCE RxPoRT: THE CouRTs, supra note 32, at 67. See also California Workbook,
supra note 59; Garwood, Democracy and the Popular Election of Judges: An Argument,
16 Sw. UJ. 216 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Garwood]; Hall, Merit Selection and Merit Elec-
tion of Judges, 4 GA. ST. BJ. 169 (1967); Hays, Selection of Judges in Oklahoma, 2 TuLsA
L. REv. 127 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hays]; Hunting, supra note 49; Nelson, Variations
on a Theme - Selection and Tenure of Judges, 30 S. CAr. L. lEv. 4 (1962); O'Connell &
Means, Should Judges be Selected by the Merit Plan? 40 FLA. B.J. 1146 (1966); Parsons, The
Selection and Tenure of Florida Supreme Court Judges, 9 MIAI L.J. 271 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as Parsons]; Sears, Judicial Selection - The Horse Before the Cart, 48 ILL. B.J. 272
(1959); Segal, Nonpartisan Selection of Judges: Pennsylvania's Experiment, 50 A.B.A.J. 830
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Segal]; Special Comm. on Revision of the New York State Con-
stitution, For Appointment 24 N.Y. Co. B. BuLL. 214 (1967); Judicial Selection and Tenure,
supra note 29; Note, Judicial Selection and Tenure in Indiana: A Critical Analysis and
Suggested Reform, 39 IND. L. REV. 364 (1964) [hereinafter cited as judicial Selection in In-
diana]; Judicial Selection in North Dakota, supra note 32.
See also N.Y. Times, July 27, 1973, at 30, col. 2; id., July 20, 1972, at 32, col 2; id,
Mar. 6, 1970, at 38, col. 2. Of course, the elective system is not without its supporters. See
e.g., E. COSTIKYAN, BEFm CLosEr Doons 173-221 (1966) [hereinafter cited as CorTiKYAN];
Desmond, 6 Good Judges-An Argument in Support of Elective Process, 171 N.Y.L.J. 17,
Jan. 24, 1974, at 25, coL 1; Golomb, supra note 3; Harding, supra note 14; Keefe, Judges
and Politics, 20 U. Prrr. I. REv. 621 (1959); Roth, Why I Am Against the California Merit
Plan, 42 CALmr. ST. B.J. 346 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Roth]; Spence, Should Judges Be
Selected by Merit Plan? No, 40 FLA. B.J. 1147 (1966).
03 Other advocates of election, such as former New York County Democratic Leader
Edward N. Costikyan, openly acknowledge the "deals" that New York City Democratic and
Republican leaders jointly work out under the present system, but argue that the system
of partisan election should be retained but improved so as to bolster the two-party system,
which they deem essential to our democracy. See COSTKYAN, supra note 62. See also N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1970, at 32, col. 3; Judicial Selection in New York-What Improvements
Are Needed?, Discussion Symposium at Ass'n of Bar of City of New York, Jan. 30, 1973.
This argument appears to be the epitome of what lawyers call a "bootstrap argument." It
bears little relation to the issue at hand, somehow seeking to laud the most unfortunate
aspect of the present system (i.e., the political influence underlying it) by simply ignoring
its evils.
64 Former Justice Samuel Rosenman has replied thusly:
[A]ny system of judicial selection, no matter how bad, will, from time to time, pro-
duce many qualified judges-and even some outstanding judges. This has cer-
tainly been true of my own State of New York, which still uses the political, elective
system. However, the election of some excellent judges does not prove that the best
-or even that a good-method of selecting them is in operation.
Rosenman, supra note 4, at 86.
65 According to New Jersey Assemblyman Charles E. Reid, selection by appointment in
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that our present system is a system of political pay-offs rather than one
designed to find the most qualified candidates. But it does indicate
that merely switching to an appointive system may not be enough. The
lesson here appears to be that some form of mandatory screening of all
candidates, whether appointed or elected, is essential if we are to insure
that only truly qualified jurists are selected.
One must take note of what the criticism leveled against our
present system says about the elective process itself. If, as the com-
mentators charge,66 the nominations are the result of political deals
carrying with them the promise of bipartisan support at election time,
then the nomination and election process itself is a mere charade.
Political influence does not stop upon election either. Several
critics have noted that, although elected to comparatively long terms
(14 years), our judges must still face reelection and thus are compelled
to maintain their old political ties if they wish to keep their jobs.6 7
New Jersey has merely meant that gubernatorial politics have replaced local politics:
It is not uncommon for political leaders of either party to press upon the office
of the governor suggestions for judicial appointments of lawyers only modestly
qualified by background and experience for the bench, thereby imposing upon the
governor's office the duty of rejecting such appointees. Often such rejection results
in a compromise ... Thus, a process which should be characterized by a search
for excellence ends up in a compromise in which the public may be the loser.
Reid, How to Select Judges on Merit, Bergen Record, Jan. 29, 1973, at A-20. Cf. Monaghan,
How New Jersey Selects Judges, Bergen Record, Feb. 13, 1973, at A-23.
66 Former Mayor John V. Lindsay, himself a lawyer, charged in a recent public state-
ment that, as a result of "backroom deals" and the dominance exercised over nominating
conventions by political leaders, only one slate of judges actually emerges so that the elec-
torate is deprived of any true choice: "[I]n a trade-off of court seats, the two major parties
usually nominate the same candidate, thus assuring his election." N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1972,
at 1, col. 8.
A good example occurred this past year when New York City political party leaders ex-
tracted a promise of pre-election resignation from a group of civil court judges whom they
planned to promote to the state supreme court, thus enabling the leaders (rather than the
Mayor) to pick their successors on the civil court and making a primary for those posts
an impossibility. The Editorial Board of the New York Times, among others protested
in futility:
The judicial conventions being held today by political parties in New York City
make a mockery of the law. They expose again, if further exposure were needed,
the evils of leaving the judicial selection process to the backroom wheeling and
dealing of partisan leaders who dispense patronage at the expense of justice.
Judgeships become pawns in a seedy game plan for expanding power.
N.Y. Times, July 27, 1973, at 30, col. 2.
67 Tammany Leader Richard Croker, as a justification for his refusal to permit re-
nomination of New York Supreme Court Justice Joseph E. Daly, who sought to act in-
dependently on the bench, reportedly remarked in 1899: "Justice Daly was elected by
Tammany Hall after he was discovered by Tammany Hall, and Tammany Hall has a right
to expect proper consideration at his hands." Conboy, The Selection of Judges, 2 N.Y.U.L
REv. 27, 29-30 (1925). See also Allard, supra note 32, at 385-87; Daniel, Lawyers Should Lead
in Judicial Tenure Reforms, 49 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 109, 110 (1965); Lyman, Connecticut and
the Missouri Plan, 30 CONN. ST. B.J. 390, 391 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Lyman]. Former
Texas Governor Price Daniel correctly noted:
No judge can devote the full, and complete time necessary for the maximum exer-
cise of his judicial ability when he is having to prepare for, and keep his eye on
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The Public's Lack of Knowledge About the Candidate
The Jacksonians conceived of the elective system as a method of
assuring that the judiciary would be responsible and answerable to the
people.68 But one can fairly ask: In today's society does an election for
judicial office really serve that function? Even before the urbanization
of our society, the growth and dispersal of our population and govern-
ment had caused the public's contact with its elected officials to become
remote at best. Urbanization has, of course, increased this phenomenon.
Even in state legislative campaigns, where a fair amount of local
advertising and canvassing is done by the candidates, the populace
knows very little about the nominees between whom they must choose.
Party line voting for such candidates still continues, while cross-over
voting seems more and more common in elections involving our more
visible and better publicized candidates for the United States Senate,
state governorships and the Presidency.
Candidates for judicial office do little, if any, campaigning for their
posts. And many segments of the public openly frown upon vigorous
campaigning; in the last two Court of Appeals elections, much criticism
was heard regarding the quality and dignity of some of the candidates'
advertising, not to mention the amount of money expended. At the
supreme court and local level, the candidates rarely do more than slip
a postcard listing the barest information into a mailbox or under a
door. Very little is written in the press regarding the courts, except in
the most sensational cases. No public watchdog over the day-to-day
operation of the courts exists. How then is the public supposed to learn
anything about the candidates from whom it must choose? And if it
doesn't know, how can it select the best man?
This problem is exacerbated by the question of what standards or
guidelines the public should bring to bear on its choice. Can the public
really know what factors (other than the obvious ones such as honesty
and the like) will make a good judge? Can the lay public evaluate a
judge's legal ability? Serious doubt exists as to whether the public has
the ability to exercise the function envisioned for it by the Jacksonian
advocates.69 The scant empirical data available seems to indicate not.
possible opponents or worry about the effect his decisions may have on the next
election.
49 J. Am. J D. Soc'y at 110. Of course, in New York, the lengthy 14 year terms of our
judges help to somewhat alleviate this problem.
68 See note 32 supra.
69 The New York Times touched on the problem in an editorial calling for mandatory
screening of all judicial candidates by an impartial blue-ribbon panel prior to nomination
and election:
The case for the appointment, rather than the election, of judges seems to us to
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Two studies conducted in the 1950's and 1960's are regrettably
illustrative. Following the 1966 election, Elmo Roper &c Associates
asked one cross section of voters (a) if they had actually voted for any
judicial candidate, and (b) if they could remember the name of any
jfidge for whom they voted. Only 55 percent answered in the affirma-
tive to the first question and just 42 percent did for the second.70
Twelve years earlier, a poll by the New York City Bar Association,
conducted in New York City, Buffalo, and Cayuga County, showed
that a bare 19 percent in New York City, 80 percent in Buffalo and 4
percent in Cayuga could name a single judicial candidate in the then-
recently completed 1954 election. Sixty-one percent, 48 percent, and 75
percent, respectively, admitted that they had paid no attention what-
soever to the judiciary candidates in their voting.71
be persuasive. Voters stumbling through crowded ballots cannot hope to know the
qualifications or lack of them of most of the candidates for judicial posts, who
normally owe their nominations to entrenched party organizations. Judicial posts
are part of their dispensable patronage, and too often the test applied is less
genuine merit than long-term service in partisan causes.
N.Y. Times, July 20, 1972, at 32, col. 2. As Robert E. Allard said while Director of Special
Projects of the American Judicature Society: "The little empirical evidence available sug-
gests that, in such elections, voters have neither ability, information, nor inclination to
assess the qualifications of a long list of judicial candidates." Allard, supra note 32, at 385.
Many commentators and judges note that voters tend to vote a straight party ticket See,
e.g., Hall, Merit Selection and Merit Election of Judges, 4 GA. ST. BJ. 169, 170 (1967);
Lyman, supra note 67, at 391. Others emphasize that in many areas only one political party
is in control, so that no real election is held or can realistically be expected. See, eg., Gar-
wood, supra note 62, at 220; Parsons, supra note 62, at 276. An incisive explanation is
provided in Judicial Selection in Indiana, supra note 62, at 366-67:
For many years there appears to have been little dissatisfaction with the election
method. In the rural agricultural society of the last century lawyers made fre-
quent appearances in the courts. Because the voters had their turn as jurors and
the farmers frequently attended terms of the local court as spectators, the leaders
of the bar were well known to many of the electorate who therefore could make a
reasonable choice among the relatively small number of "qualified" lawyers who
sought judicial office. In contrast, the choice among judicial candidates in present
day elections is seldom based upon first hand knowledge or reliable information,
let alone upon the impression of personal observation in the courtroom or else-
where. Only a small segment of the electorate is ever involved as parties, witnesses
or jurorsa a trial, and the news media generally focus upon the trial's sensational
aspects rather than upon the judge or counsel. While a great number of the
electorate have many contacts with attorneys in the course of their business or
personal affairs, a statewide candidate's qualifications for judicial office can be
known only by an infinitesimal percent of the total electorate. As to candidates
elected in the state at large or in the major cities, it may be speculated that in
many instances most of their names are first noticed when the ballot is seen in the
voting booth.
70 N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1967, at 46, col. 2. See also SELECTION OF JUDoEs, supra note 6,
at 7 n.32. The League of Women Voters conducted a survey and found that 88% of those
polled had cast their votes for some of the judicial candidates but only half of them could
remember the name of any judge they had voted for; most said they had either voted a
straight party ticket or merely picked a name that sounded familiar. VanOsdol, Politics
and Judicial Selection, 28 ALA. LAW. 167, 169 (1967).
71 Note, How Much Do Voters Know or Care about Judicial Candidates?, 38 J. AM.
Ju. Soc'y 141 (1955). See also Allard, supra note 32, at 385; Haggert, The Case of the
Nebraska Merit Plan, 41 NEB. L. Rxv. 723, 733 (1962); Hays, supra note 62, at 128.
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The Public Image of the Judiciary
Many able lawyers will not consider state judgeships because they
view the elective process professionally demeaning and costly.72 Fre-
quently, it appears, their attitude would not be the same if state judges
were appointed. The answer sometimes offered by the proponents of
election is that any man who is not willing to undergo the scrutiny of
an election should not be permitted to sit on the bench in any event.73
Advocates on both sides of this controversy recognize that it goes
to the heart of our constitutional system of the "separation of powers"
among the three branches of government. Pro-election spokesmen, con-
veniently ignoring the federal mold which is the basis for the "separa-
tion" doctrine, argue that a shift to appointment by the Governor or
the Legislature will deprive the judiciary of its separateness. 4 Those
who favor appointment contend that, to preserve the separateness of the
Judiciary, a method of selection which is separate and different from
that of the Legislature and executive is what is needed.75
Additionally, the latter group asks, What does standing for elec-
tion really show about the qualifications of our candidates?7 Many law-
yers feel that, if there is no serious in-depth campaigning and political
debate, the election process is really something of a farce in which they
Similarly, in the 1962 election in Los Angeles County, only 50% of those who voted
on legislative matters at the polls cast votes in the judicial election. Figuring in the amount
of absenteeism in the election, altogether only about 30% of the eligible voters participated
in the judicial election. See Nelson, Variations on a Theme -Selection and Tenure of
Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. Ray. 4 (1962). Only this past year in Philadelphia, despite a well
organized campaign by a nonpartisan civic group called "Good Judges for Philadelphia,"just 20% of the electorate voted in the judicial election for 39 Court of Common Pleasjudgeships. Two hundred and fifty-five candidates were on the ballot. A prominent judge
publicly called the election "the ultimate in absurdity." N.Y. Times, May 21, 1973, at 29,
col. 2. But see Desmond, supra note 62, pointing out the surprising incidence of cross-over
voting in Erie County in the 1973 contest for Chief Judge.
72 See Garwood, supra note 62, at 234; Dunn, supra note 32, at 302; Henderson & Sin-
clair, The Selection of Judges in Texas, 5 HousroN L. RLV. 430, 459 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Henderson & Sinclair].
73 See, e.g., Golomb, supra note 3, at 217; Roth, supra note 62.
74 Id. But cf. Winters, supra note 49, at 525.
75 See note 62 supra. See also Schrader, Judicial Selection: Taking the Courts Out of
Politics, 46 A.BA.J. 1115, 1116 (1960); Turley, Judicial Selection and Tenure, 25 TENN. L.
REV. 352, 353 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Turley].
70 See note 67 supra. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has ob-
served:
The effects of selection of judges by political leaders rarely end with a judge's
election. He may feel indebted to his party and hence feel an obligation to repay
party workers with judicial patronage, e.g., guardianships or refereeships. More-
over, since he must run for re-election, he has to keep up his political connections
and build political goodwill during his tenure in judicial office. Even where it has
been the practice not to nominate a candidate to run against an incumbent judge,
these political ties continue and are renewed by the necessity of facing even the
formalities of an election.
SUrarxroN or JuDGrs, supra note 6, at 7-8.
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would be embarrassed to partake.77 Others feel that judges should con-
centrate on the law, not politics, and simply should not have to be
bothered with elections and reelections.78
Regardless of who is right on these philosophical questions, there
appears to be no dispute of the basic premise, which is that a greater
number of able lawyers would be willing to become state judges if the
selection process were clearly related only to merit and did not require
an initial election. Given this fact, it appears manifest that some change
in the present system is necesary if we are to improve the level of our
judiciary.
"Elitism" and Miscellaneous Arguments Pro and Con
Practically speaking, probably the most effective argument raised
by the pro-election forces is that appointment will somehow favor the
social and economic elite.79 Those groups, they claim, dominate the bar
associations which have traditionally had a great say under appointive
systems. Whether or not this argument is accurate or even relevant in
today's society, it has strong roots historically and continued appeal to
the mass of voters who fear the spectre of a system of rich man's courts.
People truly believe that a switch to appointment will result in even
fewer judges from our ethnic minorities and fewer female judges than
we have now.
Advocates of appointment retort that this argument is no longer
valid, that the upper classes no longer dominate the bar, and (pointing
to the federal courts) that their system concentrates on the merits and
competence of the candidates, thereby effectuating the principal goals
of any selection system. 0 The experience of those states using the ap-
pointive system seems to bear this out,81 but the question is far from
resolved, if soluble at all.
77 See note 72 supra. See also Vanderbilt, Impasses in justice, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 267,
275 (1956). Professor Wigmore stated his view on the matter somewhat colorfully:
[A]n individual judge who decides his cases by submitting his own mind to the
ignorant demands of the populace is recreant to his sworn constitutional duty. He
is helping to undermine justice according to law and truth.
It follows that any political practice which continually subjects judges to the
strain of such a temptation is a false and unworthy practice.
Such a practice is that of nominating and electing judges by popular vote.
Wigmore, Pontius Pilate and Popular Judgments, 25 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 60, 61 (1941) (em-
phasis in original).
78 The cost of financing a campaign (i.e., the matter of campaign contributions) alone
may subject the judge to a possible compromising situation at a later time. See, e.g., Utter,
supra note 2, at 843; Judicial Selection in North Dakota, supra note 32, at 336. In addition,
any time spent on compaigning, however minimal, is time away from and distractive from
the judicial duties which the judge was elected to perform. See Hays, supra note 62, at 129.
79 See, e.g., Roth, supra note 62, at 354; SM rxMoN OF JuDGEs, supra note 6, at 5.
80 See note 62 supra.
81 See, e.g., Roberts, 25 Years Under the Missouri Plan, 28 TEXAs B.J. 451 (1965); Wat-
[Vol. 48:496
JUDICIAL SELECTION
Those favoring election contend that a switch from election will
merely substitute the "politics" of the bar association (who they fear
will dominate the appointment process) for the "politics" of our party
system. 8 2 The answer to this claim is that screening panels under the
appointive system can include both laymen and lawyers alike.83 More.
over, pro-appointment spokesmen argue that bar associations are made
up of practicing lawyers whose livelihood and profession depends at
least in part on knowing that the courts will construe and administer
the law most competently and fairly. 4
In fairness to the advocates of election, one additional point should
be made clear: that is, that in most states, regardless of which system is
provided by law, most of the judges originally ascend to the bench by'
appointment.8 5 A 1965 survey of the Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion revealed that while 80 percent of judicial offices in this country
are elective, about 50 percent of the judges polled had initially been
appointed to office to fill interim vacancies created by death, retirement
or creation of temporary new judgeships.80 Thus, appointment alone
may not be the answer to our problems, unless combined with some
form of mandatory screening before selection.
son, Missouri Lawyers Evaluate the Merit Plan for Selection and Tenure of Judges, 52
A.BA.J. 539 (1966); Winters, supra note 49, at 526.
82 See, e.g., Golomb, supra note 8, at 218; Roth, supra note 62, at 851-54.
83 For an illuminating discussion of how such a nominating commission actually func-
tions and some of the possible administrative pitfalls to be avoided in staffing such com-
missions see, e.g., Robertson & Gordon, Merit Screening of Judges in Massachusetts: The
Experience of the Ad Hoc Committee, 58 MfAss. L.Q. 131 (1973). See also Winters, supra
note 49, at 521-23.
84 Undeniably, bar associations have their own internal politics, the reality of which
should not be ignored. Bar association politics, however, would appear to be a different
kind and less distracting from the quest for ability than the politics of political parties.
Potentially more troubling is the conflict among bar associations. For example, in New
York City, some bar groups in the outer boroughs have occasionally expressed the feeling
that the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, a very influential association, is
dominated by the large Manhattan law firms and that it fails to represent adequately the
interest of lawyers throughout the city of New York. Whether real or merely perceived,
this animosity can hamper the role played by bar associations in the selective process, as
occurred earlier this year in the case of one Queens judgeship. See note 100 infra.
80 Hall, Merit Selection and Merit Election of Judges, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 169 (1967); Hender-
son & Sinclair, supra note 72, at 442; Thompson, Selection of Judges of the California Court
of Appeal, 48 C.A. ST. BJ. 381, 581-82 (1973); Utter, supra note 2, at 842.
Robert Allard of the American Judicature Society noted in 1966:[The] so-called elective states have consistently had a large number, if not a ma-jority of judges initially ascending the bench by appointment.
In the ten year period 1948-57, more than 56 percent, 242 out of 434 of thejustices of courts of last resort in 36 so-called elective states went on the bench by
appointment. These such courts were composed entirely of appointed judges.
Allard, supra note 32, at 378.
86 See TASK FoRCE REPoRT: Tum Coutis, supra note 32, at 66.
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VI. THE POSSIBLE METHODS OF SELECTION BY APPOINTMENT
Although there are many different types of appointive plans in
operation in the world today, the two primary ones in this country
are: (1) the federal system, where the President selects candidates (usu-
ally on the suggestion or at least with the approval of the two local
United States Senators), subject to confirmation by the Senate; and (2)
the so-called state "merit plan," where the state executive selects judges
from a list prepared by a bipartisan nominating committee.
The Federal System
One major difference under the federal system is that judges are
appointed for life,87 whereas a key feature under the "merit system" is
that they be required to stand for reelection by non-competitive vote
of the people, usually within a short period (e.g., one year) after ap-
pointment. In this way, the advocates of the merit plan contend, the
ultimate say is still left with the public, who can remove anyone "mis-
takenly" appointed. 88
By and large, and especially in the federal courts in New York, the
federal system appears to work quite well. The federal judiciary is
highly regarded by lawyers and the public, and, rightly or wrongly,
enjoys a reputation for dignity and quality which the state judiciary
has never seemed able to engender. The federal judiciary appears, al-
most universally, to be considered superior to the various state judici-
aries in this country.8 9
A great deal of the credit probably goes to the United States
87 The debate over "life tenure" goes back to the great debates of the 1780's over the
proposed United States Constitution. The concept of life tenure, subject only to impeach-
ment by the Congress for "misconduct," was designed to insure that the courts would be
above political and other non-legal pressure, and is central to the concept of the Consti-
tution itself. Alexander Hamilton argued in THE FERALxsT No. 79 that such tenure "is
consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character" which the Constitution
envisioned when it established a separate judiciary. But, of course, this independence places
a heavy burden of care upon those selecting our federal judges. Professor Philip B. Kurland,
a leading Supreme Court scholar, has cautioned:
It should be kept in mind that the provisions for securing the independence of
the judiciary were not created for the benefit of the judges. . . . Judicial inde-
pendence is held in trust for the people and only they should determine whether
they would like to exchange some judicial independence for more judicial effi-
ciency.
Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History,
36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 698 (1969). See also Turley, supra note 75 at 353-57. Cf. Hunter,
supra note 14, at 460, criticizing the federal system's life tenure and suggesting that "a
less traumatic means of removal [than impeachment] might be devised" to remove un-
qualified federal judges.
88 See Judicial Selection and Tenure, supra note 29, at 273-74. See also Braithwaite
Removal and Retirement of Judges in Missouri: A Field Study, 1968 WASH. U.L.J. 379
(1968); Note, A Study of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 47 DENvrv
L.J. 491 (1970).
89 For example, a study conducted in Texas by University of Houston Political Science
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Senators and the President who make the federal appointments. Thus,
although history shows that our Presidents have tended to pick persons
of political persuasions similar to their own, most modem Presidents
and many Senators have sought the view of the American Bar Associa-
tion and other bar groups regarding the candidates they propose.90 In
New York, for example, Senator James L. Buckley is reportedly advised
by a small coterie of prominent and highly able lawyers, which has
proposed a number of the excellent new judges who have recently
ascended to our local federal bench.
But, at this stage, it does not seem possible to transplant the federal
system to our state judiciary. First of all, the federal system is now 175
years old; it was not always as well regarded as it is today, either by the
Bar or by Congress,"' nor was it so administered.9 2 We have neither the
time to experiment nor the luxury of "starting from scratch," which
would appear necessary to implement the federal system. Our courts
are already overloaded with cases and too bureaucratically organized.
Even more importantly, since those directly involved on the' fed-
eral level, our United States Senators, are well known to the public and
consequently under dose public scrutiny, a form of behind-the-scenes
"check" on their conduct, which would not appear to exist for their
lesser known state and local counterparts, appears to exist. Significantly,
no state has adopted the federal system, nor does there appear to be
any prominent movement to do so.
The Merit System
Most scholars and reformers have traditionally advocated the so-
called "merit plan" for the state courts. First proposed by the American
Judicature Society in 1914, the "merit plan" usually has three features:
Professors B. C. Henderson and T. C. Sinclair in the late 1960's showed that by over-
whelming percentages, ranging from 98.5% to 76.9%, Texas lawyers considered their fed-
eral judiciary "less corrupt, more learned, more dignified and more efficient" than their
state judges. Likewise, nearly 72% said they would seriously consider accepting a federal
appointment, whereas less than 49% would even consider acceptance of a state judgeship.
Henderson & Sinclair, supra note 72, at 459; accord, Garwood, supra note 62, at 234.
90 See, e.g., Grossman, The Role of the American Bar Association in the Selection of
Federal Judges: Episodic Involvement to Institutionalized Power, 17 VAND. L. REV. 785
(1964); Scott, The Selection of Federal Judges, 24 WAsH. & Ln L. REv. 205 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Scott]. But see Miller, The Selection of the Federal Judiciary: The Profession
Is Neglecting Its Duty, 45 A.B.A.J. 445 (1959); Miller, Politics and the Courts: The Struggle
for Good Judges Goes On, 42 A.B.A.J. 939 (1956).
91 See, e.g., IsToRY oF THE UNrrED STATFs Dismcr COURT FOR THE SouTmERN Driucr
OF Nmv YORK, at 1-3 (Federal Bar Council 1962).
92 In an early incident, when President John Adams sought to create a whole new
crop of federal judgeships on the eve of Thomas Jefferson's ascendency to the Presidency,
an outraged Congress promptly repealed Adams' Judiciary Act of 1801. See H. CARMAN,
A HssrOay OF THE AmcAN PEOPLE 318-19 (1960). It was this incident which gave rise to
the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 US. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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(1) Nomination by a bipartisan committee of a list of candidates
certified to be highly qualified;
(2) Appointment by the Governor from the list;
(3) Public review of all appointees at a non-competitive election
(i.e., a public referendum as to whether the particular judge
should be reappointed or dismissed), to be held shortly after
appointment (e.g., one or two years later)S3
The American Bar Association formally endorsed such a merit plan
in 1937 and in 1962 adopted a Model State Judicial Article which
codified its three basic tenets.94
The essence of the merit plan is its emphasis on competence as a
basis for judicial selection.9 5 By careful screening, the nominating com-
mittee not only reviews but can also seek out the most able lawyers
available to stand for selection. Thereafter, the new judge's perfor-
mance is tested by the people in a non-competitive election where only
his record is at issue. In theory at least, the system would focus inquiry,
by both the governor and the public, upon the qualifications of the
candidate, and only on that.
In practice, however, much depends on the ability of the nominat-
ing committee to insure that its selections are politically, socially and
economically non-partisan. In a sense, that is a potential problem which
will always plague or threaten the merit plan. Yet, the numerous "post-
mortems" which have been written about the Missouri plan over the
past few years have generally concluded that the caliber of the bench
there has been greatly improved by its implementation, that the courts
93 See SE.LErION OF JuDEs, supra note 6, at 12 et seq.; TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
CouRTs, supra note 32, at 66-68.
According to recent statistics compiled by the Institute of Judicial Administration,
since Missouri pioneered the merit system in 1940, the merit selection aspect of the "merit
plan" has now been adopted in 10 states (Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Utah). Merit retention is used in fourteen states (e.g.,
California, Colorado, Maryland, Alaska, Iowa, and Oklahoma). In several others, voluntary
use of this system is made by some of the authorities who select judges. For example, in
New York City, both former Mayor Wagner and former Mayor Lindsay voluntarily im-
plemented a variant of the merit system for their New York City Criminal and Family
Court appointments since 1960. While some, such as Pennsylvania, have dabbled with the
merit system but ultimately rejected it, movements for adoption of the merit system are
afoot in every state. See A GumE TO CouRT SYSTEMs 23-24 (Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion 5th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as A GUIDE TO COURT SYsTEMs].
94 7 BULL. AM. JUn. Soc'Y 61, 84 (1914); Text of the Model State Judicial Article, 47
J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 8 (1963).
95 As summarized in Dunn, supra note 32, at 304:
A judicial selection and tenure system should fulfill three requirements: (1) Selec-
tion in the first instance must be according to qualifications of professional com-
petence. (2) Security of tenure for the qualified must be provided. (3) There must
be adequate means of removing those who demonstrate unfitness for office.
See also Wood, Elements of Judicial Selection, 24 A.B.A.J. 541 (1938).
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have gained added respect among both the Bar and the public and that
the system has not fallen prey to partisan or socio-economic discrimina-
tion. 6
Other potential weaknesses are inherent in the merit plan. For
example, who will serve on the nominating committees? How will they
be selected? How will their own performance be reviewed? In what
manner will the judge's qualifications be aired in the reelection cam-
paign?97
The method suggested in the 1970 Judicial Reform Bill for the
screening commission there proposed (i.e., selection in part by the Gov-
ernor and in part by the local and Appellate Division presiding justices)
offers one workable method.98 Another possibility was recently pro-
posed for New Jersey whereby the nominating committee would be
elected by the members of the Bar in the county in which they reside or
work.09
Careful drafting of the implementing legislation can remove many
of these problems, as follows: (a) by dividing the power to select the
committee among the Governor, presiding judicial leaders and non-
partisan civic groups; (b) by requiring that the committee itself be
bipartisan; (c) by requiring that the Governor pick some minimum
stated percentage of nominees from the minority party or from "inde-
pendents"; (d) by listing categories of qualities upon vhich the com-
mittee must rate the candidates; (e) by insuring that some laymen are
on the committee; (f) by staggering the terms of the committee mem-
bers and changing its personnel every few years; (g) by requiring the
committee to report its results in writing; and (h) by adequately fund-
ing and staffing the committee, so as to insure that it has the ability to
do its job effectively.
VII. MANDATORY SCREENING: THE MINIMUM SOLUTION
If the foregoing indicates anything, it is that the answer to our
problem of judicial selection appears to lie more in the screening
process than in the mechanics of selection itself. There is some volun-
tary screening going on already by the local bar associations.100 But this
00 See note 81 supra. See also Gershenson, A Reply Concerning Missouri Court Plan,
33 FLA. BJ. 22 (1959); Roberts, Twenty-Five Years Under the Missouri Plan, 3 GA. ST.
Bj. 185 (1966).
97 In view of the public's lack of information regarding the qualifications of sitting
judges, the merit retention aspects of the plan poses the danger that voters will be in-
fluenced by the popularity of a judge's decision, which could be destructive of the system.
98 See notes 46-54 supra.
90 Reid, How to Select Judges on Merit, Bergen Record, Jan. 29, 1973, at A-9.
100 And in New York City, former Mayors Robert Wagner and John Lindsay both
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is not mandatory screening and is of no binding effect. Candidates
sometimes boycott the screening process and those expressly declared
as unqualified still can run and have been elected.
A good example was provided in New York and Bronx Counties
in 1968 when 17 new judgeships were created. County leaders of both
parties initially agreed to support only those nominees which a blue-
ribbon panel of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
chaired by former Justice Botein, certified as qualified.'01 Unfortu-
nately, when the Botein Committee refused to certify four nominees
of the then Bronx County Democratic Leader, he broke the pact and
nominated them anyway. All were elected, amid a futile public out-
cry. 02
Moreover, as already noted, the bar associations have been sub-
jected to criticism themselves, as unrepresentative of the community
as a whole and as subject to their own "politics.' 10 3 A screening com-
mission, such as the nominating committee utilized or called for under
the merit plan of appointment and the 1970 Reform Bill, can readily
be utilized to screen our elective candidates, as well as appointive can-
didates. If all candidates are required to be certified by such a commis-
sion as "highly qualified" (provided the commission itself is carefully
selected, staffed and run, as pointed out above), we will be assured at
least that all potential selections will be ably suited for office. Regard-
less of whether we stick to elections or switch to appointment, New
York deserves at least this minimum but potentially far reaching re-
form.
VIII. OTHER PROPOSALS
A number of other alternative means for improving our system of
selection warrant some brief comment.
committed themselves to appoint city judges from lists of nominees suggested and cleared
for qualification by a non-partisan 25-man Committee on the Judiciary. See TASK FoRcE
REPORT: Tan COURTS, supra note 32, at 66; Lindsay, supra note 8; Segal, supra note 62, at
830. Mayor Abraham Beame has recently said that he will continue this procedure. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 3, 1974, at 27, col. 1. Indeed, promptly after taking office, Mayor Beame refused
to reappoint a Queens County Criminal Court Judge, despite the public and private
urging of Queens County Democratic Leader Matthew J. Troy, since both the Mayor's
Committee on the Judiciary and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York had
recommended against reappointment of the judge involved. Significantly, the Queens
County Bar Association had found the judge "qualified," but Mayor Beame chose to dis-
regard that contrary finding. Id.
101 TOLCHIN, supra note 4, at 131-34.
102 Herman Badillo (who was then Bronx Borough President and is now a United
States Congressman) among others, angrily branded this incident "an outrage to everyone
who believes in good government and respect for the judiciary." TOLcOHN, supra note 4,
at 33.
103 See notes 82-84 supra.
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Salaries of Judges
One suggestion focuses on the age-old cure-all, money- that is,
an increase in judicial salaries. A recent study by the American Judica-
ture Society shows that New York trial and appellate judges (whose
salaries range from $37,817 to $49,665) are already the highest paid in
the nation.10 4 But by improving the pay we offer our judges we may be
able to attract better candidates away from lucrative private practice.
Some states have already reacted to this problem. For example, Califor-
nia grants automatic salary increases to its judges every four years based
upon the fluctuation of per capita income in the state.
The argument, it should be noted, is not limited to the state sys-
tem. Distinguished advocates, such as former United States District
Judge Lawrence Walsh, have raised it with regard to the federal ju-
diciary,10 , and in response thereto, Congress created a special commis-
sion in 1967 to review and revise all federal salaries continually, includ-
ing those of the judges. 06
It seems true that many able lawyers who would like to become
judges simply will not offer themselves because of the financial difficul-
ties they feel they would face, even at the apparently high salaries we
now pay. With earning power far in excess of those figures and with
college-age children to educate and homes to maintain in the face of
skyrocketing inflation, many of our ablest lawyers are asked to make a
genuine financial sacrifice under the present system. 0 7
But money alone is not the answer. Raising salaries will not insure
that the more able (and now willing) candidates will be elected or that
the unqualified choices are "screened out." This is not to say that
judicial salaries should not be raised; rather it merely means that more
must be done if the selection process is really to be improved.
Discipline and Removal
Another proposal would focus our efforts on judicial discipline
and removal, rather than pre-selection screening. As noted earlier, the
Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts focused its atten-
tion in this direction, calling for a Committee and a Court on the Ju-
diciary to sit in review of our state judges, with power to censure and
remove them. 03
104 169 N.Y.L.J. 10, Jan. 15, 1973, at 1, col. 5; 169 N.Y.L.J. 13, Jan. 18, 1973, at 1,
col. 3.
105Walsh, Two Basic Steps Toward the Better Selection of Federal Judges, 12 Am.
U.L Rrv. 14 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Walsh].
106 2 U.S.C. § 356 (1970).
107 See, e.g., Utter, supra note 2, at 843-44; accord, Walsh, supra note 105.
108 Judicial Administration 1972-73, supra note 5, at 721-23.
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Eleven other states currently have Courts on the Judiciary and
twenty-one states have Judicial Qualifications Commissions which re-
view the conduct of sitting judges.10 9 New York basically relies on the
four appellate division courts for this purpose, 011 but this method places
a difficult burden on the judges to oversee their own colleagues.
Regardless of the form used, such after-the-fact review has many
disadvantages and is not an adequate substitute for pre-selection screen-
ing. First of all, it can be a difficult and messy process to remove a
judge, especially when the charges against him are less than outright
corruption. Secondly, it can do the public image of the judiciary no
good to have judges removed."' Deficiencies which might have pre-
vented a judge's selection in the first place, had there been mandatory
screening before selection, may look pale to a reviewing committee
which must also consider the effect on the public's and bench's own
confidence when a sitting judge is removed. The threat of inquisition
may also dampen the willingness of able candidates to serve, since the
very fact of inquiry may prove fatal to the career of an official serving
in such a trusted capacity; subsequent exoneration can rarely remove
the stigma. And finally, but at least as importantly, why should the pub-
lic be subjected to the risk of bad judges in the first place? The litigant
who will have suffered from improper judicial conduct will never re-
coup his loss and will find little solace in the subsequent removal of the
judge. Our focus should be on trying to avoid any chance of an error
before it can happen, after which, of course, a "retention review" can
and should still be made.
The Career or Professional Judiciary
Other proposals seek to borrow from the European and other for-
eign systems of judicial selection: that is, the so-called "career" or "pro-
fessional" judiciary. Under the civil law system in countries such as
France, Belgium and Germany, judicial candidates undergo postgrad-
uate training which teaches them to be judges."" Admission is fre-
quently on a competitive basis, with law school graduates taking an
109 A GumE To CouRT SysrEMs, supra note 93, at 29.
110 Specific complaints in New York are handled on an ad hoc basis by the convening
of a special Court on the Judiciary. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22. See also TASK FoRcE R -
PORT: THE COURTS, supra note 32, at 71; Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, Judicial Re-
moval in New York: A New Look, 40 FoRDAmnnv L. REv. 1 (1971).
1l Witness the "removal" of New York County Supreme Court Justice Mitchell D.
Schweitzer in 1972, who was accused of outright corruption on the bench. Another em-
barassing case was that of Supreme Court Justice-elect Seymour Thaler who was con-
victed in federal court of receiving stolen bonds. See 169 N.Y.L.J. 44, Mar. 6, 1973, at 1,
col. 8.
112 See Alexander, supra note 29, at 64.
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entrance examination and other factors, such as moral character, also
being considered. 113 At the school, specific attention is given to-the par-
ticular type of court on which the candidate will ultimately serve,
which is also often selected by some form of aptitude or achievement
examination." 4 Thereafter, the graduate enters the civil service where
he works his way up the ranks, often via special appointment by the
national Justice Ministry."15 Variations, of course, occur under all of
these systems." 06
One must remember, in analyzing these selection systems, that they
involve a legal system entirely different from our own. The European
or civil law system is based largely on statutes and rigid construction
thereof. The United States system and that of 49 of our 50 states (all
except Louisiana) is derived from the English common law system, not
the Napoleonic Code. The task of our judges focuses greater attention
on the peculiar facts of each case and application to those facts of pre-
vious opinions based upon other specific but similar factual situations.
Under such a system, more actual practicing experience appears neces-
sary for a judge to understand fully the problems presented to him
when on the bench. This requirement of years in practice on "the
other side of the bench," the penchant for red tape that our legislative
and executive bureaucracies seem to spawn, and the philosophical con-
siderations which led to our creation of a separate, non-bureaucratic
judiciary argue strongly against the establishment of a "career" judi-
ciary in this country. Significantly, in England, whose judicial system
is the father of and closest to our own, judges are appointed from the
ranks of highly qualified practicing barristers; there is no career judi-
ciary.117
Finally, it should be noted that various programs do exist in this
country (and in New York) to help train our judges while they are on
the bench. Since 1956 the Institute of Judicial Administration at New
York University has run an annual two-week Appellate Judges Semi-
113 See A Symposium on Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges, 11 ALBERTA
L. Ray. 279 (1973); Alexander, supra note 29, at 64; California Workbook, supra note 59,
at 175; Schram, The Recruitment of Judges for the West German Federal Court, 21 Ams. J.
CoMp. L. 697 (1973); Scott, supra note 90, at 216-26.
114 See Scott, supra note 90, at 216-22.
11.; See Alexander, supra note 29, at 64; Scott, supra note 90, at 216-22.
110 For example, in Japan, which has used this system since World War II, the first
10 years are spent as an "assistant judge." See Alexander, supra note 29, at 65-66. In Sweden,
there is a similar apprenticeship period, served in a variety of courts, so as to give the
inexperienced graduate a full picture of the judidary at work. Id. at 65. And in Germany,
after a three and one-half year apprenticeship, the candidate must pass a second bar ex-
amination. Id. at 64-65.
117 See Scott, supra note 90, at 211-216.
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nar and an Intermediate Appellate Judges Seminar."18 Other institutes,
such as the National College of State Trial Judges in Nevada, offer
courses for new and sitting judges from all over the nation," 9 and the
New York Academy of the Judiciary orients new judges in the courts
located in New York City's five counties and runs refresher seminars
for those already sitting.120 Similar programs are being implemented
for our federal judges and court staffs by the Federal Judicial Center
in Washington, D.C. 121
IX. CONCLUSION
The time is ripe and the need exists for implementation of some
program to insure that all of our judges possess the highest qualifica-
tions before they ascend to the bench. The many excellent judges pres-
ently sitting in our courts themselves favor such a reform, since it will
necessarily work to elevate the respect for their office.
At minimum, pre-selection screening by a blue-ribbon committee
selected from the bar and the public should be mandatory for all of
our state and local courts, whether appointed or elected. Procedures for
subsequent review of sitting judges are also advisable, but that form of
review alone cannot take the place of mandatory before-the-fact screen-
ing. A strong case can and has been presented for adoption of the
"merit plan"; but even as we continue to debate that question, manda-
tory screening should be established without further delay.
118 A GUmE TO COURT SYSTZMS, supra note 93, at 39; TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouITS,
supra note 32, at 68-69.
119 ld.
120 See A GuIDE To CoURT SYSTEms, supra note 93.
121 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1974, at 16, col. I (statement of Chief Justice Burger).
